The deadly derailment of a Spanish high-speed train in 2013 was put down to driver error. Authorities’ response to the incident revealed a misunderstanding of the complexities that can trigger such an incident.
On the evening of 24 July 2013, citizens of the Spanish city of Santiago de Compostela witnessed the derailment and destruction of all 13 carriages of a high-speed passenger train, in what became the second deadliest train disaster ever.
The incident happened extremely fast – friction brought the train to a standstill in under eight seconds – on a section of track infamous for its tight bend.
Spain’s extensive high-speed rail network, which uses standard gauge, unlike the broad gauge evident throughout the rest of the Iberian train network, totals almost 4000 km and is surpassed only by that of China (at a mind-boggling 50,000 km).
The hybrid vehicle, a Renfe Class S130H/S730 boasting both electrical and diesel power, could travel on high-speed and regular stretches of the nation’s network alike.
A pair of generator carriages, one located near the front of the train and one towards the rear, gave its electric traction motors the ability to work on non-electrified lines.
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Warnings unheeded
On the day of the crash, the train was packed with 218 passengers travelling on the eve of a national holiday and bound for the coastal city of Ferrol.
The infamous A Grandeira curve
As it approaches the city of Santiago de Compostela from the southeast, the high-speed rail section merges with another, older railway line about three kilometres outside the station (above). This half-kilometre-long semicircle of track, dubbed A Grandeira, has a recommended speed of 80 kph.
The train’s driver, Francisco José Garzón Amo, “failed to heed three separate alerts indicating that the train was traveling at excessive speed”, according to Shultz et. al in a 2016 journal article.
Realising at the last moment that the train was about to enter the A Grandeira curve, Amo tried but failed to slow or halt the vehicle. It was too late.
The train entered the curve and flew off the tracks at almost 180 kph.
“Multiple cars fell over onto their right sides, skidding with forward momentum as their roofs scraped against an imposing concrete wall erected along the curved tracks,” Shultz et. al said. “Several passenger coaches went airborne and both a generator car and a passenger coach caught fire.”
The collision killed at least 78 passengers (some sources quote 80) and injured the rest.
It became the second deadliest train accident, after the derailment of a train in Eschede, Germany, in 1998, which killed 101.
Shultz et. al observed that the 100 per cent rate of death or injury stemming from the incident “represents a ‘true anomaly’ in the history of rail crashes”.
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Sequence of failure
Both media coverage immediately following the incident and the 286-page official report from the Railway Accident Investigation Commission (CIAF) branded the disaster as entirely preventable and attributed the blame to the driver of the speeding train, who was charged with homicide by professional recklessness.
The CIAF report “opens with a terse [distillation] of the event: the crash was due to excessive speed that caused the train to derail on a sharp curve”, Shultz et. al said.
“The driver was engaged in a conversation with the track agent using the company’s mobile phone and he failed to attend to his driving duties as the train sped toward Santiago de Compostela, several minutes behind schedule. The driver was cited for breaches of protocol for failing to brake the train safely.”
The October 2015 judicial ruling that formally charged the driver reiterated that his negligence caused the derailment.
But although human error was the primary cause, Shultz et. al pointed to the absence of automated safety engineering controls that could have slowed the speeding train. Applying a systems thinking perspective, the issue was not as simple as a case of a distracted driver equalling excessive speed causing derailment, but the result of a sequence of failed controls.
The A Grandeira curve lacked an activated European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) system that could have overridden human error on the part of a driver. This kind of automated accident prevention system is present elsewhere in the Spanish train network.
“As noted by the victims’ advocacy organisation, APAFAS, perhaps if railway personnel had not distracted the driver’s attention with multiple cellular calls during a critical part of the journey, the driver would have reacted to the speed alerts and averted the crash,” Shultz et. al said.
“Furthermore, even under the circumstance where the driver was not paying attention, an activated ERTMS system would have decelerated the train to a safe speed, and again, the tragedy would have been avoided.”
Measures outlined by authorities
Key safety and structural actions taken following the disaster:
Mandate the posting of speed limit signs.
Reinforce established safety management system procedures.
Extend safety procedures to all railway companies via the National Railway Safety Authority.
Reestablish a traffic committee with representatives of all railway companies to analyse risks involving lines, vehicles and roadways.
Analyse route-specific risks when developing new rail lines.
Develop secure communication systems for train personnel that diminish risks of distraction.
Implement audio/video recording and surveillance of the driver’s cabin.
Integrate digital systems to allow for rapid reduction of train speed.
Shultz et. al called this list a “relatively limited set of remedies” that propagated a critical misunderstanding of what would need to change to minimise the risk of a similar event occurring again.
“Rather than championing the creation of multiple layers of prevention, redundant safety systems and a proactive safety culture, the solutions tend[ed] to focus on driver behaviour,” they said.
“Missing from consideration are recommendations for improving safety features of the passenger compartments (e.g. installation of passenger restraint systems, better securement of luggage, etc.) and considering how to cushion potential impact points such as the concrete retaining wall along the A Grandeira curve that contributed significantly to the severity of the injuries.
“Missing also are opportunities for public education on passenger safety precautions and how to survive a crash.”
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Did anything change?
Twelve years later, another deadly derailment occurred in Spain, this time in the south of the country. In addition to resurfacing memories of the Santiago de Compostela crash, the incident raised questions about whether the lessons of the past were learnt.
On 18 January 2026, a high-speed train derailed near the city of Córdoba before another train collided with it and also derailed. The crash killed 46 and injured 292.
Negligent driving was ruled out. The disaster was attributed to the tracks breaking almost 24 hours before the incident.
The Spanish newspaper Sur wrote that “a flaw in the configuration of the safety systems at infrastructure firm Adif prevented an automatic alert from being triggered”.
A 40 cm break in the track had caused a drop in the track circuit voltage from 2 to 1.5 V, which was detected by track monitoring systems. Despite this, no warning was provided to traffic control personnel as “the signalling system was not configured to automatically alert to such a drop due to the unreliability of the method on this railway infrastructure”, according to the police report.
A warning is generated only when the voltage drops below 0.78 V. With the voltage sitting at almost twice this value, the system interpreted the track as safe.
The Adamuz derailment shows that the response to deadly disasters doesn’t always preclude similarly deadly incidents from occurring in the future.
This article was originally published in the August 2026 edition of create with the headline “Derailed”.
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